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COPYRIGHTS-Infringement-False and
Fraudulent Material Is Entitled to
Copyright Protection
Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1973).
Plaintiff Belcher and defendant Tarbox were engaged in the business of
publishing handicapping systems on horse races. The defendant's business
operation differed from the plaintiff's in that the defendant periodically published a book or magazine containing reprints of handicapping systems while
the plaintiff published his handicapping systems separately. When the defendant reprinted six of the plaintiff's systems, the plaintiff brought suit in
federal district court for infringement of his copyrights, trademarks, and
tradenames. The trial court held that the copyrights of five of the six systems had been infringed and awarded the plaintiff injunctive relief and damages. In finding that the authenticity and origin of the sixth system were
fraudulently misrepresented, the court held that it was not entitled to copyright or trademark protection. Both parties appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Held-Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.' A copyrighted work is entitled to judicial
protection from copyright infringement even though its content may be
2
fraudulent and misleading.
3
A copyright is an author's exclusive right to publish his literary property.
Although the copyright laws arose from both common law and statutory origins, 4 copyright law in the United States has evolved primarily through federal statutory enactments. 5 In granting authors and inventors a limited economic monopoly over their works, Congress intended to benefit society as
1. The district court's decision as to the sixth copyright was reversed, and the case
was remanded solely to determine the plaintiff's damages which resulted from the sixth
infringement. Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1973).
2. Id. at 1088.
3.

Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180, 185 (No. 7644)

(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861).

"'Literary property' is a general term which is used either to describe the interest of
an author.

. .

in his works . . . or to denote the corporeal property in which an in-

tellectual production is embodied." Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 271 (Cal. 1956).
For other definitions of literary property see Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 662 (2d Cir. 1955); Carpenter Foundation v. Oakes, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 375 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
4. For the distinction between a common law copyright and a statutory copyright,
see Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909); Smith v. Paul,

345 P.2d 546, 554 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 1-215 (1970). Article I, Section 8, clause 8 of the United States

Constitution empowers Congress to grant copyrights and patents to authors and inventors. Pursuant to its constitutionally delegated power, Congress enacted the Copyright
Act of 1790. Since then there have been four revisions of the federal copyright laws.
The present copyright laws are codified in Title 17 of the United States Code.
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a whole through the encouragement of science and the useful arts. 6 This
Congressional intent was so evident that the courts have had little difficulty
in construing the copyright laws so as to ,conform with this beneficial pur7
pose.
The procedural requirements for procuring a copyright are prescribed in
Title 17 of the United States Code. The first, and the most important step
is the publication of the copyrightable work containing notice of the copyright.8 The author then must deposit and register two copies of his work
containing the copyright notice with the Copyright Office 9 which will then
issue the author a certificate of copyright. 10 Since the copyright laws do
not require an inspection of the contents of a work," a copyright can be
obtained for almost any original material, 1 2 but the mere fact of its possession will not automatically entitle the holder to protection against copyright
infringement. The federal courts are the only means through which a fed3
eral copyright can be enforced.'
The basic issue presented in the instant case is whether a copyrighted
work whose subject is fraudulent and misleading is entitled to copyright pro6. The public purpose underlying the creation of the copyright law is distinctly
expressed in the Constitution. "Congress shall have the power . . . to promote the
progress of Science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries .... ." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. And described in the preamble of the original copyright act, "An
act for the encouragement of learning .... " Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 stat. 124.
7. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, -, 93 S. Ct. 2303, 2309, 37 L. Ed. 2d
163, 173 (1973); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Washingtonian Publishing
Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 12728 (1932).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970). Publication with notice is essential since this act creates the copyright. The proper form of the notice is set out in 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
9. 17 U.S.C. §H 11, 13 (1970). This section also requires that all requirements
concerning deposit and registration of the material to be copyrighted must be completed
prior to the maintaining of any action for copyright infringement.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 209 (1970).
11. 41 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 396, 399 (1958).
12. Originality of material is a prerequisite for obtaining a copyright. Gardenia
Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Stuff
v. La Budde Feed & Grain Co., 42 F. Supp. 493, 495 (E.D. Wis. 1941). For cases
construing the requirement of originality see Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d
512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945); Dorsey v. Old Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 873 (10th
Cir. 1938); Jones Brothers Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338 and 1400 (1970) respectively provide for federal jurisdiction and venue over all violations of the federal copyright laws. 17 U.S.C. § 112
(1970) prescribes the manner in which the federal courts are to protect rights under
the copyright laws. Until recently, it had been generally assumed that the federal government had pre-empted the field of copyright protection pursuant to Title 17 of the
United States Code and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
However, the Supreme Court has recently created a limited state role in that field. In
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), it was held that states may provide copyright protection for intellectual property not covered under federal law since copyright
protection is not solely a federal function. Id. at -, 93 S. Ct. at 2311, 37 L. Ed.
2d at 176.
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tection. In affirmatively resolving the issue, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit noted that the Copyright Act imposes no duty upon the courts
to examine the contents of copyrighted works prior to granting copyright
protection and stated that the assumption of such a duty would only create
problems of judicial interpretation on both the practical and theoretical levels. 14 In arriving at this decision, the court summarily dismissed the idea
that public policy was involved and declared that it failed to see what public
policy would be furthered by denying copyright protection to fraudulent material. 15 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wallace maintained that the issue
should have been decided under principles of equity as mandated by Section
112, Title 17 of the United States Code.10 To refute the contention that
courts should not deny protection to a copyrighted work because of its subject matter, he pointed out that courts in the past have denied copyright
protection to obscene or immoral works.1 7 Implying that the same rules
should be applicable to cases involving fraudulent material, Judge Wallace
concluded that to do otherwise would constitute a legal condonation of fraud
and the contravention of the public policy which established the copyright
laws.18
If Belcher is viewed solely from its own perspective, it appears to be a
confusing decision based exclusively on practical considerations unsubstantiated by legal precedent and made without any consideration for the formulation of an adequate legal rationale to guide future litigation. These
weaknesses are partially attributable to the prior cases which have dealt with
the same issue, but which, because of their contradictoriness, have failed
to clarify this area of copyright law.

In Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan

Piano Co.19 the plaintiff brought suit for infringement of the copyright on
his piano advertising booklet. Applying the equitable doctrine of "clean
hands," the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the plaintiff relief
because the advertising booklet tended to deceive the public. 20 In Advisers,
Inc. v. Wiesen-Hart, Inc.2 1 an opposite conclusion was reached although the
factual situation was identical. Here the plaintiff brought suit for copyright
infringement on his discount coupon booklet. The District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio held that although the booklet was fraudulent in
that its value was misrepresented to the public, it nevertheless was entitled
14. Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1973).
15. Id. at 1088.
16. Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1973). Judge Wallace also
implied that the court should have followed Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano
Co., 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915) and Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
488 (1942) as controlling case law.
17. Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
18. Id. at 1090.
19. 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915).
20. Id. at 843.
21. 161 F. Supp. 831 (S.D. Ohio 1958).
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to copyright protection. 22 In a more recent decision, International Biotical
Corp. v. Associated Mills, Inc., 23 a federal district court followed the rationale used in Stone & McCarrick. By invoking the "clean hands" doctrine,
the court declined to enforce the plaintiff's design patent and copyright because the plaintiff had made misrepresentations to the court, the Copyright
Office, and the general public.2 4 Since the prior cases exhibit no logical
progression in theoretical development, it is not surprising that the Belcher
case suffers from the same infirmity.
The reasons for the absence of legal theory in the relevant case law can
be imputed to the use of equitable remedies to resolve the issue and to
the fact that the courts have applied equitable remedies without giving sufficient consideration to whether the results of their decisions would conform
to the legislative intent behind the copyright laws. Ideally, equitable principles are to be uniformly applied by the courts. In actuality, however,
the subjective opinion of a trial judge tends to determine what is inequitable conduct, and this fact combined with the unique situation presented
by each case has produced varying results from apparently identical circumstances. 25 Additionally, the courts' neglect in considering copyright policy in conjunction with their dispensing of equity probably has been a major
factor responsible for retarding the development of any controlling standard. 26 In all four of the cases in point, the copyright policy of "promoting
the progress of science and the useful arts" 27 was given little, or no, consideration. If any legal continuity is to emerge in this area of copyright law,
a combination of copyright policy and equity must be used to resolve future
litigation.
An excellent illustration of how those elements were used to effectively
resolve a sensitive issue similar to the one presented can be seen in Martinetti v. Maguire.28 Martinetti was the first United States case to decide
the question of whether an allegedly obscene copyrighted work was entitled
to copyright protection. 29 The plaintiff filed suit alleging the copyright in22. Id. at 834. It should be noted that the court did not substantiate its opinion
with any legal precedent. The conclusions of law were drawn solely from the factual
circumstances of the case.
23. 239 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
24. Id. at 516.
25. Compare Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F. 837 (5th Cir.
1915), with Advisers Inc. v. Wiesen-Hart, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 831 (S.D. Ohio 1958).
26. See Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1973); Advisers Inc. v. Wiesen-Hart, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 831 (S.D. Ohio 1958).
27. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (No. 9173) (C.C. Cal. 1867).
29. The first case in which it was conclusively established that an immoral work
was not entitled to equitable protection from infringement was Stockdale v. Onwhyn,
108 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B. 1826). The rule in that case was established upon common
sense and the proposition that it was beneath the dignity of the law to protect an obscene work. Id. at 66.
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fringement of his dramatic composition. In denying the plaintiff relief, the
court held that since the dramatic work was merely a gorgeous spectacle,
it was not entitled to be copyrighted.3 0 The court further held that even
if the plaintiff's play were assumed to be copyrightable, it would not be
entitled to copyright protection because of its obscene and immoral
content.8 ' In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that since immoral or obscene works neither contribute to the progress of science and
the useful arts nor advance the public welfare, they certainly should not
receive the protection of a court of equity. 2 The rationale in Martinetti
was so persusaive that it has been recognized as controlling precedent in
all subsequent cases where obscene works were denied copyright pro33
tection.
Due to the impact of the Martinetti decision, it would appear that the
same rationale would be readily adaptable to works which are fraudulent.
This approach would not be novel because the courts have previously borrowed theories from other related areas to resolve issues with which the
statutory copyright laws have been unable to cope. The "misuse" defense
used in copyright infringement litigation is a prime example of such adaptation. The "misuse" defense essentially is the assertion that the holder of
an exclusive government-granted privilege should not receive governmental
protection when he uses it to subvert the public policy under which the
privilege was granted. The defense was initially accorded judicial recognition in the area of patent law and was indirectly applied to copyright litigation through dicta in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.8 4 In Morton
Salt the plaintiff brought suit alleging that the patent on its salt tablet dispensing machine had been infringed. The defendant, Morton Salt, admitted
the infringement, but contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief because it leased its patented machines only if the prospective
lessee agreed to exclusively use salt tablets manufactured by the plaintiff's
subsidiary. The Court accepted the defense explaining that the public policy responsible for creating the patent laws likewise prohibited any unlawful
patent extension because of its adverse effect upon the public interest 8 5 One
year later in Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young,3 6 the "misuse" defense was again
recognized as a valid defense to a suit of copyright infringement, but was
30. Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (No. 9173) (C.C. Cal. 1867).
31. Id. at 922.
32. Id. at 922-23.
33. See Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947); Barnes v. Miner, 122
F. 480, 490 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903); Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 174 (C.C.
N.D. Cal. 1898). M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHTS § 36, at 146.28 n.654 (10th ed. 1973).
34. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).

35. Id. at 492. The Court was so concerned with restricting patent misuse that
it did not require injury attributable to patent misuse as a prerequisite to asserting this
defense. Id. at 494.

36. 138 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1943).
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disallowed because the plaintiff's conduct was held not to constitute a misuse of his copyright.3 7 It was not long thereafter that the defense received
complete acceptance through its successful assertion in M. Witmark & Sons
v. Jensen38 in which it was held that the plaintiffs had illegally formed a
monopoly by combining their copyrighted musical compositions. 39
One obvious consequence of applying the rationale used in Martinetti v.
Maguire40 to copyright cases involving fraudulent misrepresentation would
be the creation of another defense to a copyright infringement. However,
because this defense would be merely a variation of the "misuse" doctrine
formulated in Morton Salt, giving it legal recognition would not be overly
extreme. 41 The distinction between the wrongs which the two defenses are
designed to prohibit is only one of degree. It is incongruous for the courts
to prohibit a copyright holder from illegally extending his copyright and yet
permit him copyright protection for fraudulent products and advertising
methods because both acts contravene the public interest. As the dissenting
opinion in Belcher clearly indicates, the toleration of such an anomaly is
tantamount to a condonation of fraud by our legal system. 42 If a vendor
uses his copyrighted product to defraud the public, he deserves to lose his
exclusive privilege to sell it. 43 In an era when fraudulent misrepresentation
is all too common, the American consumer needs all the protection that the
44
law will afford.
James R. Low, Jr.
37. Id. at 976. For a discussion of this area, see Comment, The Defense of Misuse in Copyright Actions, 41 DENVER L.J. 30, 34 (1964).
38. 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed, 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.
1949).
39. Id. at 850.
40. 16 F. Cas. 920 (No. 9173) (C.C. Cal. 1867).

41. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942). The scope of this
defense would naturally have to be confined to situations where the copyrighted work

was intentionally misrepresented or fraudulently created. Failure to narrow its application would result in possible first amendment violations, insurmountable problems of
interpretation, and contravention of the public policy which engendered the copyright

laws.
42. Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
43. The practical advantages of this defense should also be considered. Any product deprived of copyright protection under this defense would return to the public domain. Thus another opportunity for its improvement or proper application would be
provided, and the progress of science and the public interest would be furthered.
44. This defense is not intended to supplant the regular tort remedies for fraudulent
misrepresentation. In many cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, however, the consumer's loss is small enough to make utilization of the tort remedies impractical due
to the high cost of litigation. Thus this defense would act as a deterrent in such situations.
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